Memorandum of Conference on January 19, 1961 between President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy on the Subject of Laos

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

… President Eisenhower opened the discussion on Laos by stating that the United States was determined to preserve the independence of Laos. It was his opinion that if Laos should fall to the Communists, then it would be just a question of time until South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma would collapse. He felt that the Communists had designs on all of Southeast Asia, and that it would be a tragedy to permit Laos to fall.

(Declassified, White House Guidelines, April 30, 1991)

8 April 1963

Support to [Hmong] tribesmen began initially in January 1961 when authority was given to train and arm 1,000 to serve as a guerrilla force. From that time until 8 October 1962, with the approval of the Special Force, the organized [Hmong] forces were increased to a maximum strength of 19,500. These [Hmong] were trained to various degrees, given arm, organized into several types of guerrilla units, some of which were mobile, and certain personnel were selected for leadership and communications training…

It is of interest to note that in Xieng Khouang Province, which includes the currently critical Plaine des Jarres area, there are between 5,000 and 6,000 [Hmong]. They are principally in defensive positions atop the hills which encircle the Plaine des Jarres.

Cia.gov
(Sanitized Copy Approved For Release 2010/06/29)

Washington, July 18, 1969

SUBJECT
The Situation in Laos

Since 1962, this Agency has played a major role in support of United States policy in Laos. Specifically, we have developed and maintained a covert irregular force of a total of 39,000 men which has borne a major share of the active fighting, particularly in Northeast Laos. In this latter area, under the leadership of General Vang Pao, guerrilla units formed of [Hmong] tribesmen have been engaged for more than eight years in a seesaw battle with the North Vietnamese Army and Pathet Lao troops.

Source: history.state.gov

** By this year, the CIA’s secret army was re-organized and designated as the “Special Guerrilla Units” (SGU).

Congressional Record - Senate

May 7, 1970

“Censorship took out of the transcript all summary figures on costs; every reference to the Central Intelligence Agency's operations, which include training, equipping, supplying and directing Gen. Vang Pao's ‘clandestine’ army of up to 36,000 [Hmong] tribesmen in Laos; all references to the use of Thailand's forces in Laos; details on U.S. air operations from Laos; figures showing the escalation of American airstrikes in Laos during bombing ‘pauses’ or the halt in the air war against North Vietnam, and other critical facts...

“U.S. airstrikes in Laos have been reported to run up to 600 or more sorties a day. The transcript shows that in northern Laos the average sortie costs $3,190 and delivers 2.2 tons of bombs. This would add up to a cost of $1,914,000 for a day of 600 air sorties.”

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Intelligence Oversight Board

May 7, 1976

Dear Mr. President:

The Intelligence Oversight Board is hereby reporting to you and the Attorney General, pursuant to Section 6(a) (v) of Executive Order 11905, on an activity of the Intelligence Community which raises legal questions.

The activity in question is the expenditure of appropriated fund for the resettlement of the [Hmong] tribesmen in Laos by the CIA in the absence of a specific Presidential finding, pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, that this operation was “important to the national security of the United States” and of a timely report to the appropriate committees of the Congress.

We are reporting this activity to you because we have determined that there is an absence of clear legal guidance in the Intelligence Community on compliance with Section 662. In the case of the [Hmong] tribesmen, no definitive legal opinion was ever sought by the National Security Council. Although the issue of whether the [Hmong] expenditures were illegal is very unclear, understanding of the problem demonstrates the need for better legal guidance in this area.

The [Hmong] had participated in a CIA paramilitary program in Laos since 1961. In November 1973, the 40 Committee approved a CIA program to aid the [Hmong] in Laos in order to strengthen anticommunist Laos elements. In January 1975, after the effective date of Section 662 (often termed the “Hughes-Ryan Amendment”), a description of the program for aiding the [Hmong] in Laos was included in the Omnibus Finding covering all ongoing covert actions and the accompanying briefings to Congressional committees. The resettlement of the [Hmong] •••••• was necessitated by the fall of Laos to the communist in May 1975. The remainder of the fiscal year 1975 funds allocated for aid to the [Hmong] in Laos was expended for their resettlement •••••••

—

Source: Gerald R. Ford Library Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Soc. 3.6
7/22/1998
Retrieved 2023